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dard to determine whether the jury release was proper. The latest
decision applying the Perez standard, Downum v. United States,84
held that a jury dismissal due to unpreparedness of the prosecution
was improper and a bar to retrial because it did not fall within
the Perez exceptions. In Tateo, the Court was divided on the sig-
nificance of Downum. The majority distinguished jury discharges
due to prosecutorial negligence and jury discharges after coercion
of the defendant by the trial judge. Mr. Justice Goldberg dissented
and stated that the majority unjustifiably limited Downm to its
particular facts. He was of the opinion that coercion by the trial
judge is an even more severe abuse of a defendant's rights than is
prosecutorial negligence.35 The majority, however, found support
for its decision to allow retrial on the questionable assumption that
granting Tateo immunity from retrial because a trial judge coerced
his guilty plea would necessarily result in similar immunity after all
trial reversals due to error.8 6
It is submitted that Tateo should be considered a mistrial case-
i.e., one where the judge improperly chose to exercise his discretion
and terminate the trial before the jury reached a verdict. The judge
himself coerced the plea that resulted in dismissal of the jury. Such
a termination before verdict is not within "manifest necessity" or
in the interests of "public justice," the only circumstances justifying
retrial under the Perez rule.
RAYMOND W. RUSSELL
Constitutional Law-jury Selection-Defendant Not a Member of
the Excluded Class
In Allen v. State,1 the Georgia Court of Appeals was faced with
the question of whether the constitutional rights of a white de-
fendant were violated by the systematic exclusion of Negroes from
-"372 U.S. 734 (1963).
" "If anything, Tateo's deprivation is more serious. The purpose of the
judicial coercion in his case was to deny him the right to have the impaneled
jury decide his fate, whereas this was merely the effect of prosecutorial
negligence in Downum." United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 473 (1964)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 466. In England, unlike the United States, reversal due to
error means that the defendant goes free. Criminal Appeal Act, 1907 § 4.
See generally KARLEN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
ENGLAND (1963).
'137 S.E.2d 711 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964).
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the jury that indicted and convicted him. Defendant, a member of
the white race, was engaged in voter registration among Negroes.
He was indicted and brought to trial on a charge of assault with
intent to murder a police officer. Defendant entered a plea of not
guilty and followed this with a motion' to quash the indictment of
the grand jury. He also challenged the array of traverse jurors for
that term of court.' The motion and the challenge were made on the
ground that the systematic, arbitrary, and deliberate exclusion of
members of the Negro race from both the grand and traverse juries
violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the four-
teenth amendment.4 The trial court overruled both the motion and
the challenge, and defendant was convicted.
On appeal,5 the court reversed and held that equal protection
and due process of law require that a defendant be indicted and con-
victed by a jury from which no class is systematically excluded.
The court said that when an accused is tried by a jury, the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment guarantees him, re-
gardless of his race, a jury that is "impartially drawn from a cross-
section of the community."' Furthermore, the court said that due
process is denied when the procedures meant to insure trial by a
2 The motion alleged that of the population twenty-one years of age and
over residing in the county, 46.42% was Negro, and that of the listed tax-
payers, from whom the jury list was drawn, 27% were Negroes. The tax
returns, from which the tax list was composed, were segregated on the basis
of race and filed in separate volumes, with the tax returns of all Negroes
being on yellow sheets marked "colored" and the tax returns of Caucasians
on white sheets designated "white"; and that the tax digest from which
prospective jurors were selected was segregated, with the two races being
grouped on separate sheets headed by a racial designation. The defendant
further alleged that no Negro had been selected from the tax digest by jury
commissioners for over forty years and that no Negro had been called to
serve on either the grand or the traverse jury. 137 S.E.2d at 712.
'The procedural steps to be taken by a defendant in protecting his con-
stitutional rights with respect to jury formation often require meticulous
attention to detail. For a detailed analysis of the problems involved and the
proper procedure for raising the constitutional issues, see Jefferson, Race
Discrinination in Jury Service, 19 B.U.L. REv. 413, 432-47 (1939). See
also 33 N.C.L. Rtv. 262, 265-66 (1955).
'U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which provides that no state "shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
' Under Georgia law the state cannot appeal an adverse judgment in a
criminal action except in contempt cases. Glustrom v. State, 206 Ga. 734,
740-47, 58 S.E.2d 534, 538-42 (1950). Therefore the decision of the Court
of Appeals was final as to the question which was before it in Allen.8 137 S.E.2d at 715.
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fair and impartial jury are not used, i.e., when the jury is not
selected in accordance with the constitutionally valid laws of the
state.7
It is settled constitutional law that the systematic exclusion of
Negroes from a state court jury before which a Negro is tried
violates either the equal protection' or due process clauses.0 This
rule of law has been extended to protect any member of any class
that has been systematically excluded from jury service.10 However,
7Id. at 717.
'E.g., Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964) (per curiam);
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1950); Brunson v. North Carolina, 333 U.S. 851 (1948); Norris v. Ala-
bama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); Carter
v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880). See generally Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1291 (1948); 26 N.C.L. REV.
185 (1948). The intentional inclusion of Negroes on a Negro defendant's
jury is also grounds for finding a denial of equal protection. Cassell v. Texas,
339 U.S. 282, 287 (1950) (dictum); Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100 (5th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 33 U.S.L. WEnlc 3169 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1964). In
Collins the jury commissioners deliberately included Negroes on the jury
list from which the jury panel that indicted the Negro defendant was
chosen. The defendant instituted a habeas corpus proceeding; in reversing
the indictment and conviction, the court of appeals said that a "Negro is
entitled to the equal protection of the laws, no less and no more. He stands
equal before the law, and is viewed by the law as a person, not as a Negro."
329 F.2d at 105.
'E.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). Although the
verbal vehicle used in cases on exclusion in jury selection is equal protection,
the technique is that invoked in cases formally based on due process. The
reason a Negro defendant is allowed to invoke the due process clause is that
a jury from which Negroes have been excluded will not give him a fair
trial. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 301-02 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
The equal protection foundation for reversing such convictions is that a
white defendant would get better treatment from an all-white jury than
would a Negro. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 285 (1947). See Bittker,
The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experience in Race Relations,
71 YALE L.J. 1387, 1406-07 (1962); Scott, The Supreme Court's Control
Over State and Federal Criminal Juries, 34 IowA L. Rv. 577, 584 (1949).
o Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), is the most significant case
pointing out that the equal protection clause is not limited in application to
members of the white and Negro race but extends to any class against whom
community prejudice exists. The Supreme Court therein stated that "com-
munity prejudices are not static, and from time to time other differences
from the community norm may define other groups which need the same pro-
tection .... The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely against dis-
crimination due to a 'two-class theory'-that is, based upon differences be-
tween 'white' and Negro." Id. at 478. Accord, United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 170 Fed. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1909) (court upheld challenge to a jury
comprised primarily of farmers); Commonwealth v. Powers, 139 Fed. 452
(E.D. Ky. 1905), rev'd on other grounds sub nora. Kentucky v. Powers, 201
U.S. 1 (1906) (discrimination against political groups); Searle v. Roman
Catholic Bishop, 203 Mass. 493, 89 N.E. 809 (1909), and Juarez v. State,
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a defendant is not entitled to demand that members of his race or
class be placed upon the jury before which he is tried," nor is he
entitled to demand any type of proportional representation of his
class on the jury.'" Rather, the fourteenth amendment requires that
an accused be indicted and tried "by a jury from which all members
of his class are not systematically excluded-juries selected from
among all qualified persons regardless of national origin or de-
scent."'" In order to have an indictment quashed or a petit jury
discharged on grounds of discrimination in selecting jurors, the de-
fendant must show that members of his class were excluded because
they belonged to that particular class, rather than because they
failed to qualify under state or federal law.' 4 However, a prima
facie case of discrimination against a race or class by the officers
in charge of jury selection is made out when there is (1) proof of
the exclusion of a racial group for a number of years, 5 or (2) an
undenied affidavit alleging discriminatory practices by jury of-
ficials,' 6 or (3) a failure to follow a procedure or a "course of con-
duct" that would prevent discrimination on the basis of race or
102 Tex. Crim. 297, 277 S.W. 1091 (1925) (discrimination against religious
groups).1 Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1880).12Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945) ; Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278
(1909).18 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954).
"Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945) ; Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1(1944); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); Tarrance v. Florida, 188
U.S. 519 (1903).
1 In Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947), the Supreme Court
declared, in a unanimous opinion, that "when a jury selection plan, whatever
it is, operates in such way as always to result in the complete and long-
continued exclusion of any representative at all from a large group of
Negroes, or any other racial group, indictments and verdicts returned against
them by juries thus selected cannot stand." Id. at 469. Complainant had
shown that no Negro served on the grand jury for thirty years. Accord,
Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964) (in twenty-four years one
Negro served on grand jury); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958)
(only one as long as the clerk of court could remember); Hill v. Texas, 316
U.S. 400 (1942) (none in sixteen years); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1940) (five in seven years); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935)
(none for a long number of years); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880)
(none for at least ten years). Discrimination may also be established by
the admission of officials of intentional exclusions of a racial group. E.g.,
Eastling v. State, 69 Ark. 189, 62 S.W. 584 (1901); Washington v. State,
95 Fla. 289, 116 So. 470 (1928).
10 Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 616 (1938).
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class.' When the defendant is a member of the excluded class, he
is presumed to have been prejudiced by the exclusion," and a trial
under such conditions therefore constitutes a denial of equal pro-
tection or due process. But when the defendant is not a member of
the excluded class, it is uncertain as to whether he may successfully
challenge such discrimination in jury selection. State courts, other
than that in Allen, have been unanimous in holding that no consti-
tutional right of the defendant is violated in such an instance."
While the Supreme Court has never entertained the question, the
actions2" and language2" of the Court have indicated that the de-
" In Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953), evidence disclosed that white
and yellow tickets were used by the jury commissioners in drawing a jury
list. Only the names of white persons were on the white tickets, and only
the names of Negroes were on the yellow tickets. This, combined with the
fact that no Negro had been selected for jury service, was held to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination. Accord, State v. Speller, 229 N.C. 67,
47 S.E.2d 537 (1948).
"
8E.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306
U.S. 354 (1939).
19 Alexander v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 460, 274 S.W.2d 81 (1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 872 (1954), illustrates the position of state courts. De-
fendant, a white man, attacked his indictment, alleging systematic exclusion
of Negroes from the grand jury. The court refused to entertain defendant's
objection to exclusion of Negroes from the jury since he was not a member
of the excluded race. In Commonwealth v. Wright, 79 Ky. 22 (1880), the
Kentucky court, in affirming a white defendant's conviction, said that "it
cannot be true that one belonging to the race not excluded, but from which
the whole jury was required to be selected, can have been prejudiced by the
fact that another race was excluded." Id. at 24. Accord, Griffen v. State,
183 Ga. 775, 190 S.E. 2 (1937); State v. Lea, 228 La. 724, 84 So. 2d 169
(1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956); State v. Dierlamm, 189 La.
544, 180 So. 135 (1938) ; Petition of Salen, 231 Wis. 489, 286 N.W. 5 (1939).
Cf., State v. James, 96 N.J.L. 132, 114 AUt. 553 (Ct. Err. & App. 1921);
State v. Trantham, 230 N.C. 641, 55 S.E.2d 198 (1949); State v. Sims, 213
N.C. 590, 197 S.E. 176 (1938); Commonwealth v. Garletts, 81 Pa. Super. 271(1923). The Arkansas Supreme Court in Haraway v. State, 203 Ark. 912,
159 S.W.2d 733, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 648 (1942), upheld the conviction of a
Negro defendant by an all-Negro jury. The defendant sought to overturn
the conviction on the ground of systematic exclusion of members of the
white race from the jury which convicted him. The court said that appellant
had no more right to complain than a white man would have for being con-
victed by an all-white jury, and that if there was any discrimination, it was
in appellant's favor.
"9 Compare State v. Koritz, 227 N.C. 552, 43 S.E.2d 77, cert. denied,
332 U.S. 768 (1947), with Brunson v. North Carolina, 333 U.S. 851 (1948)
(per curiam), which were companion cases and alike in every respect ex-
cept that Koritz was a member of the white race and Brunson a Negro.
Both cases were appealed to the Supreme Court, but certiorari was granted
only in the case of Brunson and his conviction was reversed because of the
systematic exclusion of Negroes from the jury. The same jury tried and
convicted both men, and both had appealed on the grounds of systematic
[Vol. 43
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fendant in a state court must be a member of the excluded class in
order to object to the systematic exclusion of a class from jury
service.
In departing from the majority view and holding that equal
protection is denied when the jury panel is- not chosen from a
cross-section of the community, the Georgia court looked to Supreme
Court decisions dealing with federal proceedings. The position taken
by the court in Allen is best set forth in Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co.,"
which arose out of a civil suit in a federal court and in which the
Supreme Court held that systematic exclusion of daily wage earners
was reason for striking the jury panel even though the petitioner
was not a member of that class. In Thiel, the Court said that the
American system of trial by jury contemplated "an impartial jury
drawn from a cross-section of the community. '23 The Court made
it clear that this did not mean that every jury should be representa-
tive of every class found in the community, but rather that juries
should be selected without systematic and intentional exclusion of
any class.24 The Georgia court also relied upon Supreme Court de-
cisions more directly on point, in which the convictions of male
defendants were reversed because of the exclusion of women from
the juries that indicted or convicted them. In these decisions, the
exclusion of Negroes. The Court has denied certiorari when defendant
was not a member of the excluded race in a number of instances. The cases
are collected in note 19 supra.
11In Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955), the Court said that the
"indictment of a defendant by a grand jury from which members of his
race have been systematically excluded is a denial of his rights to equal pro-
tection of the laws." Id. at 87. (Emphasis added.) In Norris v. Alabama,
294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935), the Court said that excluding Negroes from serv-
ing as grand jurors in criminal proceedings against Negroes denies equal
protection to the Negro defendants. The Court, in Martin v. Texas, 200
U.S. 316 (1906), said that, "what an accused is entitled to demand, under
the Constitution of the United States, is that in organizing the grand jury
as well as in the empaneling of the petit jury, there shall be no exclusion of
his race ... because of race or color." Id. at 321. (Emphasis added.)
- 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
Id. at 220.
"Ibid.
"The court also cited Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946);
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); United States v. Roemig, 52
F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Iowa 1943). In Glasser, the Court said that "democracy
itself, requires that the jury be a 'body truly representative of the com-
munity,' and not the organ of any specific group or class." 315 U.S. at 86.
The court relied heavily upon Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940), a
case appealed from the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. The conviction
of appellant, a Negro, was reversed by the Supreme Court on evidence that
19651
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Court again emphasized that the jury panel should be truly repre-
sentative of the community. The attitude of the Supreme Court in
federal proceedings is best reflected by the following statement of
Mr. Justice Douglas in Ballard v. United States:
20
The evil lies in the admitted exclusion of an eligible class or group
in the community in disregard of the prescribed standards of jury
selection. The systematic and intentional exclusion of... a racial
group, ... deprives the jury system of the broad base it was de-
signed by Congress to have in our democratic society.27
However, the fact that these decisions arose out of federal pro-
ceedings detracts from their value as precedent because the Court
exercises a supervisory power over federal proceedings not ap-
plicable to the states.2" Under this supervisory power, a standard
of impartiality even more stringent than that required to date under
the sixth amendment29 is imposed upon federal jury selection
methods.30 Thus, the Court's disapproval of a particular procedure
there had been discrimination against Negroes in the selection of the grandjury that indicted him. In this case the Court first spoke in terms of a
jury being "truly representative of the community." Id. at 130. The sig-
nificance of Snith is that the Court seized upon this dicta in later cases, and
made of it a standard for federal jury selection to which standard the state
courts have not been held.
2 329 U.S. 187 (1946).27 Id. at 195.
28 See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), where it was said:
[T]he scope of our reviewing power over convictions brought here from
the federal courts is not confined to ascertainment of Constitutional
validity. Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in
the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized
standards of procedure and evidence. Such standards are not satisfied
merely by observance of those minimal historic safeguards for securing
trial by reason ....
Id. at 340. For an illustration of the effect of supervisory powers on state
and federal proceedings, compare Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310(1959), with Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947). See generally Note,
76 HARv. L. Rzv. 1656 (1963). For an exhaustive compilation of cases and
source materials relating to jury selection in federal and state judicial pro-
ceedings, see VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRA-
TION 147-205 (1949).
"0 The sixth amendment guarantees that in all federal prosecutions the
accused "shall enjoy the right to ... trial, by an impartial jury .... " U.S.
CoNST. amend. VI.
"0 See Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948), where the Court
found no denial of trial by an "impartial jury" in violation of the sixth
amendment when defendant was convicted of violating a federal statute by a
jury composed primarily of federal employees. Four justices dissented,
saying the Court should exercise its supervisory power over lower federal
courts and reverse the conviction. Id. at 514.
[Vol. 43
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in the federal courts does not mean such a procedure is unconsti-
tutional if practiced in the state courts.31
Although the Georgia court recognized that its authority con-
sisted of decisions dealing with federal proceedings, it deemed the
principles enunciated in those cases applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment.32 However, the court did not discuss
more recent decisions by the Supreme Court rejecting the extension
of these principles to the states. Only one year after the Thiel de-
cision, the Court, in Fay v. New York,3 3 upheld a state statute which
provided for special "blue ribbon" juries.34 The petitioner in Fay
alleged that there had been systematic exclusion of women and wage
earners from the jury which convicted him and argued that the
principle of Thiel was applicable through the fourteenth amend-
ment.3 5 The Court rejected the argument and stated that prejudice
was not to be presumed merely because the jury was not represen-
tative of the community." Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the
Court, said that those decisions requiring a jury to be representative
of the community were not
constrained by any duty of deference to the authority of the State
over local administration of justice. They dealt only with juries in
federal courts. Over federal proceedings we may exert a super-
visory power with greater freedom to reflect our notions of good
policy than we may constitutionally exert over proceedings in
state courts .... 37
A year later the Court re-enforced Fay by again upholding the con-
stitutionality of a "blue ribbon" jury even in the face of allegations
" Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
32 137 S.E.2d at 715.
" 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
' A "blue ribbon" jury represents attempts to obtain jurors more highly
qualified than ordinary jurors-those of high business standing and broad
educational standing-while a special jury suggests those selected with a view
to obtaining expert qualifications in a given field. CALLENDER, SELECTION OF
JURORS 43-50 (1924).
"5 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 33-36, Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
" In answer to complainant's objection to the systematic exclusion of
women, the Court said:
[W]omen jury service has not so become a part of the textural or
customary law of the land that one convicted of crime must be set free
by this court if his state has lagged behind what we personally may
regard as the most desirable practice in recognizing the rights and obli-
gations of womanhood.
332 U.S. at 290.
"Id. at 287.
19651
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of systematic exclusion of Negroes 3 8 Another case rejecting the
application of the federal requirements to the states is Hoyt v.
Florida,39 in which a woman appealed a conviction and claimed that
she had been denied equal protection because the jury was selected
under a statute that effectively excluded women from jury service.
The statute accorded women absolute exemption from jury service
unless they volunteered for it by registering with the clerk of court.
40
The Court in upholding her conviction condoned that which it had
so forcefully condemned in federal proceedings, i.e., the exclusion of
a class from the jury list and the resulting impossibility that the
jury represent a cross-section of the community.
The requirement of a "cross-sectional" element recognizes that
inherent in the concept of trial by jury is the idea that "the verdict
of the jurors is not just the verdict of twelve men; it is the verdict
of a pays, a 'country,' a neighbourhood, a community." 4' When a
jury list fails to contain representatives of the entire community, the
judicial system is denied the very thing it seeks, i.e., the "opinion
of the community, '42 as opposed to the opinion of a particular race
or class. The fact that the Supreme Court has not imposed upon the
states the federal requirement that a jury be selected from a list
representing a "cross-section" of the community by no means for-
bids its adoption by a state court. Rather, the federal practice pro-
vides an example for the state courts that has the approval of the
Supreme Court.
4 3
Both state and federal courts have recognized that discrimination
in jury selection can exist against classes other than those dis-
tinguishable because of race or color, and that any class may need
protection from systematic exclusion, especially if there is a chance
of community prejudice.44 In an approach along this line, the
"8 Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565 (1948). Negro defendant challenged
his conviction by a panel of "blue ribbon" jurors on the basis of systematic
exclusion of Negroes and women. The Supreme Court found that the evi-
dence did not support a reversal and that Fay was applicable.28368 U.S. 57 (1961).
"Old. at 60-61.
412 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 624 (2d ed.
1923).
"' Ibid. A more complete analysis of this concept can be found in an ad-
dress by D. H. Chamberlain before The American Social Science Asocia-
tion at Saratoga, New York, in 43 DAWSON PAMPHLETS 18-21 (1887).
" Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
" See note 10 supra.
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Georgia court left open the possibility that defendant might be a
member of a class which had been systematically excluded in the
selection of the jury panel, i.e., those interested in advancing the
"civil rights" cause.45 As the court pointed out, "where prejudice
exists against the advocacy of the Negro's full privileges and duties
of citizenship, a white person active in promoting participation in
government by Negroes would be the object of as strong adverse
prejudice as would a Negro engaged in such activities . . . ."" In
light of recent activities in some Southern communities, the court
has put it mildly to say the least." If defendant proved, as a matter
of fact, that he was a member of a class of "civil rights workers"
discriminated against in jury selection, a violation of the traditional
constitutional right of trial by a jury from which members of de-
fendant's class have not been systematically excluded would be
established.4" Furthermore, proof of membership in a class dis-
criminated against would eliminate the problem of lack of standing
to raise the constitutional issue of discrimination, if there had been
no finding of a denial of a constitutional right.
4 9
" "Furthermore, we cannot say as a matter of law that this defendant,
who was active in voter registration among Negroes, was not a member of
a group systematically excluded in selecting the grand and traverse juries."
137 S.E.2d at 715.
'6 Ibid.
41 See, e.g., Anderson, That New-F angled Thing Called Voting, New
Republic, March 28, 1964, p. 8; Huie, The Untold Story of the Mississippi
Murders, Saturday Evening Post, Sept. 5, 1964, p. 11; Mississippi Prepares
for War, Christian Century, April 22, 1964, p. 509.
4' See cases cited note 18 supra.
" The fact that neither the Supreme Court nor state courts have found a
denial of a constitutional right in the situation of the principle case makes
the standing question one of obvious importance. That standing is not an
absolute requirement of a petitioner was made evident in Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), where a white vendor was allowed to assert
the constitutional rights of Negroes as a defense in a suit for damages based
on her breach of a racially restricted covenant. Professor Sedler has
stated that there were several factors in Barrows that led the Court to by-
pass the general standing rule and allow the vendor to defend on the basis
of another's rights. These factors were: "(1) the interest of the.., petitioner,
(2) the nature of the right asserted, (3) the relationship between the ...
petitioner and third parties, and (4) the practicability of assertion of such
rights by third parties . . . ." Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus
Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 627 (1962). A comparison
of Barrows and Allen in light of these factors warrants the conclusion that
the Georgia court could have held that defendant was entitled to assert the
rights of a member of the race excluded from jury service. This conclusion
is buttressed by United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), where the
Court, in attempting to clarify the requirement of standing, reiterated the
1965]
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In holding that defendant's allegations of exclusion established
a denial of due process of law, the court stated that when a state
uses a jury trial the "accused is entitled to those procedures which
will insure, so far as possible, that the juries selected are fair and
impartial,"5 and that the constitutional requirement of a fair trial
is violated when "a criminal defendant is not accused and tried by a
jury selected .. in accordance with the law of the land-the law of
this State regulating the procedure for criminal justice."'" The
Supreme Court has stated in the past, even though subject to question
today, 2 that the sixth amendment's requirement of trial by jury
is "not picked up by the due process clause of the Fourteenth so as
to" limit the states.5 3 But if a state provides a jury trial, then there
is a requirement that the jury be impartial, in the sense of being
free from bias or prejudice. 4 The most significant point of the
general rule that a petitioner has no standing to assert the constitutional
rights of another, but recognized exceptions to the rule. One exception is
that when the constitutional rights of one not a party to the litigation are
threatened, and he has no way to preserve them himself, then the Court may
consider those rights as before it. Id. at 22. It is not denied that an individ-
ual excluded from jury service because of race or color has a statutory
remedy, 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1959). However, the value of this statute is at-
tested to by the fact that it has been used only two times in its eighty-nine
years of existence. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Brown v.
Rutter, 139 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Ky. 1956). Also, continuing discrimination
in selection of juries further illustrates that it has no deterrant effect. See
cases cited note 8 supra. Thus the application of this exception would seem
proper in the Allen situation.
50 137 S.E.2d at 716-17.
" Id. at 717.
2 Mr. Justice Brennan has expressed doubts that the Court would hold
that the fourteenth amendment does not require jury trials in state criminal
proceedings if it "is ever faced with a case in which a state has abolished
trial by jury for serious criminal offenses." Brennan, The Bill of Rights
and the States, in THaE GREAT RIGHTS 67, 80 (Cahn ed. 1963).
"Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288 (1947). Accord, Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
' In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), the Court reversed a conviction
on the basis of a denial of a fair and impartial jury resulting from pre-trial
publicity. The Court stated that "in essence, the right to jury trial guarantees
to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent'
jurors. . . . 'The theory of the law is that a juror who has formed an
opinion cannot be impartial."' Id. at 722. Accord, Rideau v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 723 (1963). Cf. In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). "There is
another fundamental requirement which is clearly of the essence of trial by
jury; the jury must be so selected and so constituted as to be an impartial
and fairly competent tribunal." ScOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE 79
(1922). See Note, 60 COLUm. L. REV. 349, 353 (1960). But see 111 U. PA.
L. REv. 1000 (1963).
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Georgia decision is the court's willingness not only to find inherent
in due process the requirement of an impartial jury but also a
requirement that the jury be selected in strict accordance with the
relevant laws. The Supreme Court itself has said that if there is a
trial by jury, that jury shall be fairly and impartially chosen. 5 To
do otherwise is to violate the procedure which will insure a de-
fendant a trial by an impartially constituted jury. 6 The words of
Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting in Fay v. New York, are particularly
applicable in pointing out why this requirement should be met: "We
can never measure accurately the prejudice that results from the
exclusion of certain types of qualified people from a jury panel.
Such prejudice is so subtle, so intangible, that it escapes the ordinary
methods of proof."5 7 The very possibility of prejudice ought to be
sufficient reason for condemning any exclusion. This is not to say,
however, that a state may not exclude from jury service those
who do not meet valid statutory qualifications or whose exclusion
is for the good of the community.5" The Supreme Court's require-
ment through its supervisory power that prospective jurors be se-
lected without systematic or intentional exclusion of any race or
class59 takes on considerable significance for the states when con-
" That by the Fourteenth Amendment the powers of States in dealing
with crime within their borders are not limited, except that no State
can deprive particular persons, or classes of persons, of equal and im-
partial justice under the law; That law in its regular course of admin-
istration through courts of justice is due process, and when secured by the
law of the State the constitutional requirement is satisfied; and that due
process is so secured by laws operating on all alike, and not subjecting
the individual to the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government un-
restrained by the established principles of private right and distributive
justice.
Leeper v. Texas, 139 U.S. 462, 467-68 (1891).
" Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945). "An allegation of discriminatory
practices in selecting a grand jury panel challenges an essential element of
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness on the part of the
judicial arm of government in dealing with persons charged with criminal
offenses." Id. at 400-01.
332 U.S. at 300.
8 1n Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906), the Court held that "if
the state law itself should exclude certain classes on the bona fide ground
that it was for the good of the community that their regular work should
not be interrupted, there is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent
it." Id. at 640. See VANDERBILT, op. cit. supra note 28, at 172; Scott, The
Supreme Court's Control Over State and Federal Criminal Juries, 34 IowA
L. REv. 577, 581-84 (1949).
"' Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
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sidered in light of the following statement by Mr. Justice Burton
in Bute v. Illinois:60
While such federal court practice does not establish a constitutional
minimum standard of due process which must be observed in each
state under the Fourteenth Amendment ... [it] does afford an
example approved by the courts of the United States. It thus
contributes something toward establishing a general standard of
due process currently and properly applicable to the states under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 6'
Applying this strict standard of impartial selection through the
due process clause to criminal proceedings insures to a defendant
those procedures that are "so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. '0 2 The adop-
tion by all courts of this standard would do much to insure that all
people, regardless of class, receive the same treatment under the
same laws, an essential requirement of ordered liberty.
Established as the rules against discrimination are, violation of
these rules continues with alarming regularity. By adopting a rule
such as that applied by the Supreme Court to federal proceedings,
all convictions in which there was systematic exclusion of a race
or class contrary to statutory provisions would be subject to re-
versal. Under such circumstances a state would have no choice but
to eliminate discrimination or abolish trial by jury, the latter a
result which most state constitutions prohibit 3 and which public
conscience would not tolerate.
RALPH MALLOY MCKEITHEN
Contracts-Credit Cards-Liability of Holder for Unauthorized Use-
Issuer's and Merchants's Duty of Due Care in Accepting Charges
In The Diners' Club, Inc. v. Whited,' a California intermediate
appellate court discussed a problem on which there are few re-
-0 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
61 Id. at 659-60.
62 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
E.g., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 13, which provides: "No person shall be
convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and
lawful persons in open court." For a compilation of state constitutional
requirements as to the necessity of a jury trial in criminal proceedings, see
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES, REPORT OF THE COM-
MITTEE ON SELECTION OF JURORs 33-35 (1942).
'Civil No. A 10872, App. Dep't Cal., Aug. 6, 1964.
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